Indonesia’s entry into BRICS+ and the ASEAN nation’s economic and foreign policy vision

Earlier this month -- on January 6, 2025 -- Brazil, which holds the presidency of BRICS+ -- from January 1, 2025 to December 31, 2025 -- announced the entry of Indonesia into the organisation.

Brazil also highlighted Indonesia’s stance on crucial geopolitical and economic issues – especially its role in pushing for South-South cooperation.

While commenting on Indonesia’s entry into BRICS+ and how it would contribute to the growth of the organisation, Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono said: “As a BRICS member, Indonesia wants to become a bridge-builder for the interests of developing economies and the Indo-Pacific nations. We will continue to remain active in preventing further escalations to geo-economic and geopolitical rivalry.”

With the entry of the ASEAN nation into BRICS+ the organisation accounts for over 40% of Global GDP and an estimated half of the world’s global population. 

The BRICS+ organisation, it’s foundation and expansion

While Indonesia’s entry into BRICS+ had been approved in August 2023, the ASEAN nation announced that it would formally join the grouping only after presidential elections were held –presidential elections in Indonesia were held in February 2024 and Prabowo Subianto was confirmed as president in March 2024 and his inauguration took place in October 2024. The group began as BRIC in 2006 – with Brazil, Russia, India and China being its initial members. 

With the entry of South Africa in 2010, the organisation was renamed as BRICS. In 2023, BRICS invited six countries -- Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates –to enter the organisation as full members. In January 2024, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iranand the United Arab Emirates joined the organisation (Argentina has rejected the offer, while Saudi Arabia has not entered BRICS until now).

Indonesia's Foreign policy

Like several countries, especially India, Indonesia has been trying to follow a balanced foreign policy, driven by its national interest, on key matters in an increasingly turbulent geopolitical landscape.

The strongest reiteration of Indonesia’s neutral foreign policy is the Russia-Ukraine issue. Then President Joko Widodo (referred to as Jokowi) invited Vladimir Putin for the G20 Summit held at Bali in November 2022, despite the displeasure of the west – Putin did not attend the Summit. Jokowi also visited both Ukraine and Russia in June 2022 and offered to play the role of peacemaker between both countries.

Indonesia’s ties with China, US and Japan

Indonesia also shares robust ties with China and is a signatory to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).While maintaining close ties with China, Indonesia also maintains robust ties with Japan and the US. In November 2024, Prabowo had visited both the US and China. In the past, there was a ban on the entry of Prabowo into the US. Japan's PM Shigeru Ishiba also visited Indonesia, days after the latter’s entry into BRICS+ and both countries agreed on the need to strengthen cooperation. Like several other countries, both Indonesia and Japan also realize that Trump 2.0 could cause major disruptions globally – especially in Asia.

After the entry of Indonesia into BRICS, Indonesia’s Deputy Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM), Yuliot Tanjung underscored the point that Indonesia via BRICS would like to cultivate close ties with both China and India. Said Yuliot: “We can utilize BRICS members for our markets such as India and China; they have large populations with large potential,” 

Conclusion

In conclusion, the expansion of BRICS+ is important for several reasons. Firstly, it underscores the growing economic relevance of BRICS+. Second, the entry of countries like Indonesia and UAE into BRICS+ highlights the fact that countries while seeking to benefit from the organisation are not keen to get caught in the geopolitical wrangling between China and the US. 

The author is a policy analyst and faculty member at the Jindal School of International Affairs, OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat. 

(Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own and do not reflect those of DNA.)