Geopolitical Defence Strategy: What is behind PM Modi's high-stakes Russia visit?

On July 8, Prime Minister Narendra Modi will start a three-day trip to Russia and Austria. This will be his first official visit abroad since he began his third consecutive term as India’s prime minister last month. Normally, Modi visits one or more of India’s neighbouring countries first, highlighting the importance of nearby nations in India’s foreign policy. So, choosing Russia and Austria this time may seem unusual. But a closer look could reveal the reasons behind this decision.

With the world constantly changing, India aims to align with various partners at different times to benefit New Delhi the most. For instance, India has been buying Russian oil at lower prices despite objections from western countries during the Ukraine conflict. Modi is skipping the 2024 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in Kazakhstan, which Putin will attend and it is unclear if he will go to the BRICS summit in Moscow later this year.

His visit to Russia during the ongoing Ukraine war will send important messages and could help resolve some issues. To begin with, this will be Modi’s first visit to Russia in five years. It is happening when the Russian president has few reliable allies or friends. Since 2000, India and Russia have held annual summits, each country hosting in turn. However, these meetings have not happened in recent years.

In 2021, Putin visited New Delhi. But, on February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, which severely damaged Russia’s relationships with western countries. Although Modi met Putin in 2022, it was not in Moscow. They met during the SCO meeting in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. At that meeting, Modi famously told Putin, “This is not an era of war.”

New Delhi and Moscow have maintained a strong relationship for many years, especially since India and the former Soviet Union signed the ‘Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation’ in 1971. When the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991, they had to redefine their relationship.

The yearly summits have been important for maintaining the long-standing relationship between New Delhi and Moscow in a changing world. Defence and energy have been central to this renewed partnership. However, the relationship is not as strong as it was before because a more economically powerful India is now looking more to the West for technology and investments.

At the same time, Russia has been getting closer to China, India’s strategic rival, especially after facing issues with the West following the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This shift towards China is a matter of concern for India, which is currently dealing with a tense border situation with China. In 2022, just days before the invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping had declared a “friendship without limits”, which greatly upset New Delhi.

Given this situation, it is crucial to engage Russia in political discussions and work on strengthening economic ties. Many of India’s military equipment are still from Soviet or Russian sources and require spare parts. For instance, most of the Indian Air Force’s fighter jets are from Russia. While India is starting to buy defence equipment from other countries, it still relies on Russia for important spare parts and the remaining S-400 air defence system units. India is also seeking replacements for some of its Sukhoi fighter jets.

Although Russia was once a reliable defence partner, New Delhi is now concerned that Russia might share sensitive technology with China or delay the supply of spare parts if conflicts arise with China or Pakistan. Therefore, maintaining a balance between its relationships with Russia and the West has been crucial for New Delhi.

Second, maintaining good relations with Russia could be beneficial if former President Donald Trump returns to the White House after the November elections. Putin has a tense relationship with the Biden administration, but had a friendly rapport with Trump in the past. There is no sign that this will change if Trump gets a second term. After last week’s presidential debate between Biden and Trump, Trump’s chances of winning have improved.

Third, Putin’s recent visit to North Korea led to a mutual defence pact. This may worry New Delhi, as India has always been concerned about defence ties between Pakistan and North Korea. A 2016 article in The Diplomat explains how this cooperation started and developed. Pakistan received long-range missiles from North Korea in exchange for nuclear technology. The potential transfer of advanced defence and sensitive space technology to Pakistan through North Korea could be problematic for India.

Fourth, India and Russia are about to sign a logistics support agreement that will help India extend its naval reach even to the Arctic and grant India access to Russian naval bases there. Similar agreements with Japan, Australia and the US are already allowing Indian ships to travel longer routes with access to ports in these countries. The region has been gaining global attention with new shipping routes opening up.

Fifth, Modi could be delivering a message from the West to Putin during this visit. Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has mentioned several times that New Delhi has acted as a messenger between the two sides and helped secure the 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative backed by the UN and Turkey, which facilitated safe grain exports from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports during the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Russia’s cooperation was vital, as it agreed to allow safe passage of these vessels through the conflict zone.

Since India has connections with both sides, New Delhi might help bring the warring parties in the Ukraine conflict to the negotiating table. If Trump wins the forthcoming US elections in November, there is a chance that US support for Ukraine may decrease. Europe, meanwhile, appears not ready to handle the responsibility alone, according to The Diplomat. So, this could be a good moment for India to step in and act as a peacemaker.

(The author of this article is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru. He is also Director of ADD Engineering Components, India, Pvt. Ltd, a subsidiary of ADD Engineering GmbH, Germany. You can reach him at: girishlinganna@gmail.com)

(Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own and do not reflect those of DNA)